Credit Crunch 2

Sadly, I believe that this recession probably has not reached its nadir. I know much evidence suggests it has, but fundamental problems remain that are being masked by the concerted action of governments in the most developed economies i.e. America, UK + Europe, and Japan. Even if recovery is now certain, crunch 2 is already set in motion.
Broadly, the problem was a collapse in confidence in the viability of high debt to income and income to savings ratios in the most developed economies. This was expressed as reduced confidence in the ability of debtors to service their loans. That problem was precipitated by a collapse in confidence in house prices as they reached unsustainable multiples of income in America and later the UK, and then other parts of Europe. That house price situation was mainly enabled by over generous lending criteria and stable low interest rates over a protracted period. At an anthropic level, irrational optimism and competitiveness are the underlying drivers of these problems. At a policy level, governments failed to take into account those human traits to exercise sensible control. At a factual level, it is obvious that no country or individual can continue to increase its debt to income ratio indefinitely, nor should have a high income to savings ratio. However, that is what governments continue to do and allow. Probably most politicians lack sufficient expertise to see and avoid the probelms. Those few that do just hope is to have their moment of glory and money, but be gone when the account has to be settled. This indicates another deep problem, that a system of government by politics is flawed at the most basic level. Government should be run by experts, not by power obsessed self-serving administrators.
Take a look at the video on this useful blog post to see a wise economist explain the debt problem in more detail, as not just a confidence problem, but also an absolute problem. Australian economist Steve Keen explains the problem, and that more trouble is to come.
The Times tell us of Ann Pettifor who also forecast the credit crunch, and also thinks the debt mountain has more trouble in store for us.
So why is the credit crunch yet to revisit us? We need to look at the main tactics being deployed to fix the crisis in confidence; they are low interest rates, public sector spending exceeding revenue, increasing the money supply, deferral of foreclosure on debtors, and direct incentives to spend. The most significant of these is ‘public sector spending exceeding revenue’. This is effectively shifting the balance of the problem from the private sector more to the public sector in the belief that confidence in a larger debtor will be higher. That is a reasonable assumption, but debts must be serviced even by government, and that is funded by taxation, which must then increase in the future. The notion is that as private sector spending slows, public sector spending is increased to help maintain business until private spending recovers. Governments have failed by overusing that tactic, so it needs cautious use. The tactic of ‘reducing interest rates’ is not safe. As we look back at the original problem, sustained low interest rates fuelled the unfounded early confidence that helped lead to high debt to income and income to savings ratios. In addition, low interest rates create compelling disincentives for savings, and low savings levels are part of the root causes of the problem. Further, the increasing retired population partly lives off the interest from its savings, so they will take a less active part in a spending lead recovery and at the margins will be looking for help. The tactic of ‘increasing the money supply’ enables more public sector capital expenditure in the short term, but also increases inflation in the midterm, which erodes the value of savings as welll as debt, further exaggerating the problems of savers stuck on low interest rates. If the problems are not rectified quickly, the tactic of ‘deferral of foreclosure on debtors’ only delays inevitable for many, and buries the remainder in long term debt. Providing ‘direct incentives to spend’ is another disincentive to save and head toward debt, so a lot of this kind of stimulus can also be a bad thing.
In conclusion, I think the wise among us know that moderation in everything is best. We have experienced a period of excess growth and are seeking to diffuse the inevitable correction and return to another period of unsustainable growth with some very strong policies over a short period. It is possible that one strong imbalance can correct another, but the stronger and faster the measures the more tortuous it is to achieve good balance again. I have low confidence that the failed institutions that enabled the problem forged in our human failings have the vision to correct it. I have even less confidence that a system of power obsessed self-serving administrators will ever be effective as government. I expect that even if this situation is rectified in the near term, unless sober experts are appointed to form governments that crunch 2 will one day visit us. On the bigger picture of how we conduct ourselves, perhaps we should question the race back to a hedonistic consumption based life style.

What should we do about the Credit Crunch?

Recent financial ructions prove again that people are sometimes better at creating situations than they are at understanding them. Few predicted the credit crunch coming, fewer predicted the scale of the problems and none predicted when it would happen. It is clear that society allows a privileged few to play games with complexity beyond their ability to manage. This would not ordinarily matter, but these games affect us all.
What can we do? We can punish the people who made large amounts of money from this debacle. We can also better regulate the financial services industry to try and prevent it happening again. We can distribute the burden for the normalisation of the excesses to us all over a prolonged period, in an attempt to soften the blow and recover confidence to prevent a worse collapse. Or, we could sharpen the focus on the problems to precipitate a more rapid and deep correction on the worst offenders, so we are all out of this mess more quickly. However, before we start pointing fingers, we should remember that most, if not all of us, benefited for a while from the period of sustained and now we see, unreasonable asset price growth and easy borrowing terms. It is human nature that failed us. Remove the people at the top who benefited most and they will be replaced by people just like them, possibly less ruthless for a while, but also probably less smart. Change the rules and they will find ways around the new rules, the whole silly mess will revisit us eventually. We need a deeper solution.
What should we do? The real problem is our archaic social structure and value systems. Leaving aside the obvious questions about the value of materialism for now, we still value chieftains i.e. people who look after the interests of our group at all costs against the interests of others. That is the way we always have selected our leaders. We seek people who can help us in alliances to vanquish our competitors. So we model ourselves on those chieftains and perpetuate this primordial human trait. Look around, the examples are clear, it is collaboration not conflict that benefits us. Everything we have that is good is an example of collaboration, not conflict. Competition is short-termism, the way of the beast; steal it today and forget tomorrow. People are at their best when they collaborate. Adversarial systems militate against our collective success. They waste our energy looking for short term advantage. We need systemic change. Humanity needs to change the way its governments work and the way business is organised and they very way we think.

Tough Times

Big price rises and restricted credit are here and are going to get worse for a while yet. As spending inevitably slows, pay demands grow and sales fall, we can expect unemployment to rise and exacerbate the situation. The whole mess will feel worse as public sector unions organise strikes to get what they feel they deserve, despite the problems we all face. Further, the corrupt politicians will award themselves yet another massive pay rise, while scamming even more from us on bogus expenses claims.

Government has borrowed heavily on our behalf in expectation of continued growth, which evidently was financial bad judgement. They borrowed in the recent good times, running up debt rather than saving for this rainy day. To balance the books now they have three tools: increase our countries already huge debt, which eventually has to be paid for with taxation, raise taxes less but immediately, cut services. Raising taxes immediately is perceived as political suicide, indeed government has just committed us to even more debt to pay for the interim 10p tax concession, so obviously the pay later option will be selected in combination with cuts to services.
These problems show how poor our system of government is: clear financial incompetence, political power placed before good judgement, corruption at the very top. Sadly the incompetence is not limited to the financial aspects of government. It seems impossible for the public sector to keep our information safe or prevent top secret information from being scattered across the country. To top the list of complaints, how did we end up in an expensive and damaging war in two countries that were no threat to us? Was it breathtaking incompetence or an ego trip for our previous PM Tony Blair? Whichever it was Gordon Brown was not seen to be against it.

We need a new form of government. One not based on an adversarial political party system run by the dysfunctional people that are politicians. Politicians tend to be self serving, power hungry, deluded and egomaniacal. Adversarial political party based government is an anachronism, we are all in this country together and we need to work together, not fight each other. We need a new government system that is not party based but formed from people of all views. It must be adaptable and able to respond rapidly to changing world conditions, not based on dogma or ideologies or evolved out of rule by despots. The system needs power to be widely distributed to deny corruption and ego. Positions need to be filled with experts, not friends and family of those with existing positions. Changes are needed to the legal system, so that it does not persecute the innocent, unlucky and misinformed, but targets the criminals. Control of the economy needs to be placed squarely in the hands of the expert with a remit of long term stability for the whole, rather than be used a tool for political party advancement. Accountability needs to be more immediate. One vote every few years for one of a small number of parties composed of dysfunctional individuals is not good enough.

To get involved in the creation better government visit this site and join the forum.

Credit Crunch Conspiracy?

I very rarely attend to conspiracy theories, when I do it’s just for entertainment value, so I am surprised to find myself writing this, but something smells odd about this credit crunch and I can’t just ignore it. Anyway you judge for yourself and correct me if you see mistakes.

I have read a lot about the credit crunch to try to understand it. Apparently it was precipitated when many more US borrowers than expected were not able to repay their residential property loans. Lenders belatedly reacted by tightening their lending criteria and something like hysteria broke out among them, restricting lending more widely and so impacting the economy as a whole. This spread to the UK and around the world via global financial institutions. I know this is a gross simplification of the situation, but documenting the hyperfine nature and causes of the credit crunch is not my task here; this is a good enough understanding for this post. For a deeper exploration see my earlier post: Understand the Credit Crunch.

For years I observed a property price bubble forming in the UK and for a while was surprised at its extent. Had I been in the US I think I would have experienced something similar. Lenders employ actuaries to do mathematical analysis and must know quite accurately at which point to restrict lending to maximise profits. So the lenders must have seen problems coming; even using the crude metric of house price growth against wage growth one could see that the situation was well away from the norm. Naturally lenders are happy with larger percentages of earnings going to them, but concerned that this extra thick slice of the pie does not get eaten away by bad debt. So how did things get so out of kilter? There are several possible scenarios:
1, the outcome is approximately what the lenders intended.
2, the actuaries got it wrong.
3, the people running the companies ignored their actuaries.
4, exceptional events confounded all the experts.

Certainly the first scenario is not claimed by anyone, so we can leave that for the moment. The second scenario does not seem likely. Actuaries are bright people that do exactly this type of mathematics for a living and they have many years of examples to draw from. Even I could see anecdotally the inevitability of most of the problems (at a course grained level obviously) only the spread of lending restrictions between financials was not obvious to me. The third scenario does have something of a ring of truth about it, because we have seen high profile heads role, but nothing like the clearout one might expect. Can the heads of so many large organisations have been so bad at their jobs? It could be self interested short-term planning by executives looking for a few years of exception bonuses and a golden goodbye. Perhaps the purge is not yet complete, or perhaps the top jobs are safe regardless. The absence of large numbers of high profile sackings implies that the financial institutions don’t attribute the problems to their executives ability or probity. The fourth scenario is also receiving some backing; in particular creative sales people supposedly managed to slip many billions of unwise lending through the system without anyone noticing. This seems more than a little improbable. I am sure that this happens on a very limited scale, but not in such amounts for so long. That would imply that nobody had noticed even the broadest of indicators looking dodgy and I feel confident that people must have been monitoring them. Perhaps I am missing one or more scenarios, but if not where does this leave us?

There is doubtless a combination of factors from the scenarios, but as much as the property price bubble was obviously forming, none of these scenarios or a combination of them is obviously causal. That leaves me reconsidering the first scenario. Perhaps we are broadly where the money lenders expected us to be. Not only have they grabbed a larger slice of the economic pie for themselves, they are seeking even more from state / central banks as support and that eventually translates into taxation. This reminds me of the old saying about owing a lot of money to the bank implies the bank owns you, but owing an amount the bank can’t afford to lose implies you own the bank. Do the lenders own us all? Are they using the state / central banks as proxies to extract even more through extra taxation on their behalf. Certainly the wealth extracted so far by them either was not created yet and that is what needs correcting, or it did and is now somewhere. If it didn’t exist that implies serious strategic mismanagement on a colossal scale, which again would be easy for the actuaries to spot. If it did exist where is it now? Have we been intentionally cleaned out by the lenders? Certainly the outcome seems to be the same.

I know that some of you will say that hindsight provides perfect vision and that the financial institutions were heading into this blind. To that I would say property price bubbles are nothing new, we have seen them before, their outcome is broadly similar. How can a property price bubble have exceptional or unexpected consequences when we have seen them before? Is something different? Well if it is simply that the scale of the thing is bigger then it should have been more obvious as it formed. It was obviously a problem building to me as a casual observer. Admittedly I did not foresee the lenders restricting credit to one another, but then it was not my concern to look out for such a problem.

Perhaps I have misunderstood or not noticed something, if so I am sure someone will put me right and that is what I think is most likely, but until I have that understanding I have to say things look suspicious.

Understanding the Credit Crunch

This post documents my understanding of the credit crunch and its associated ructions thus far, along with some wider understanding of related important economic factors. In it I address: what are the problems, what caused the problems, what are the consequences of the problems, what is being done to fix the problems and what are the consequences of this fix.

What are the problems

The problems are manifold and the pressing problems for individuals such as elusive credit, falling house prices and job insecurity are really consequences of problems in a larger picture, so I will focus on that. That larger picture has two important players, the large financial institutions and state / central banks controlled by government(s), together they modulate economies. The main macro scale problem for the money lenders seems to be a lack of confidence in their ability to avoid collapse under the weight of bad debt. Specifically, it is the fear that much more than expected of what has been lent will not be fully recovered and lead to large enough losses to make the lender unable to continue in business. The main macro scale problem for state / central banks seems to be the possible collapse of money lenders, especially those that also provide savings services. The collapse of large financial institutions will have a negative effect upon the confidence of the whole financial system that could cause a cascade of secondary problems through an economy.
Certainly there is a poor position on mortgage debt and one does have to wonder how it was not obvious to the lenders that they were getting into it, but that does not mandate rampant defaulting on repayments. It was obvious to me for years that a property bubble was forming and would need correcting. I always assumed it was even more obvious to lenders and that they had calculated the best level of risk to accept in order to maximise profits, balancing those that would continue to pay with defaulters. It is rather a surprise and suspicious that they claim not to have seen it coming. Regardless, the lack of lender confidence slows down business as usual and perversely increases the probability that lenders will fail. It is the cessation of business as usual at the money lenders that is creating the dramatic economic effects. Unless we can identify the causes and find fixes for the problems the fear of failure will translate into actual failure and the problems will be amplified.
The credit crunch problems are exasperated by shortages of food and fuel causing steep price increases. These are a simple consequence of supply not keeping up with demand. Although their timing is unfortunate they are only related in so much as they restrict consumer spending patterns, which has a deleterious effect on business, slowing overall growth and confidence.

What caused the problems

Housing has increasingly been used for profiteering. It always has been used this way by architects, builders, mortgage providers, landlords, estate agents, solicitors and surveyors, among others. However, recently two classes of interested party have burgeoned. One class is the speculators. Speculators have no product and offer no service, they are simply there to profit and are the biggest cause of the problems. Speculators pump up what they have already identified as hyperinflation in prices. Some speculators may call themselves ‘property developers’, but they do little or nothing but profit from a bubble situation. Just to be clear, people who take out buy-to-let mortgages are also speculators, they differ from traditional landlords in that they must borrow to acquire property to let. This is obviously a risky practice and inflationary for property prices. The other notable problem class is those with meagre means being offered excessively easy terms to buy.
Property was bought with increasingly easy to obtain loans for increasingly tangential reasons; for example: buy-to-let property, holiday homes, weekend homes, university accommodation and just plain resale i.e. naked speculation. This combined with the demands of rapid immigration and a property supply that did not increase quickly enough, to cause unsustainable house price rises above wage rises. Housing, like pensions is too important to be used in that way, government should impose controls to prevent its misuse.
Some of this profiteering is long term, with people using it as a pension because of the poor quality pensions. The UK government does not provide a sound pension scheme, except naturally for themselves and other public sector workers. A good pension scheme should: be 100% underwritten by the state, have a guaranteed minimum growth rate, be contribution based, have a guaranteed minimum pension at the end regardless of contributions but based on time resident, be index linked, not be means tested, be ring fenced and protected by law. It seems the government believes that only the public sector are worthy of a good pension. They are, as ever, helping themselves.
So the causes seem to be increasing use of residential property as a means of speculation and pension savings combined with poor lending criteria. The problems only seem to have become visible when the inevitable increasing bad debt arranged with less financially solvent borrowers as mortgages on inflated property prices precipitated a collapse in confidence. That increase in defaulting was triggered by an increase in interest rates which were held low for a prolonged period to avert the worsening of the previous economic slowdown. During that period many poor loans were made that could never be sustained on a return to more normal interest rates.

What are the consequences of the problems

Debt is used as money i.e. the potential to recover money at a profit from loans is being treated as money. This works well enough if you know that the loan will be repaid with interest. Unfortunately, not all loans are repaid, some fail and money is lost, but as this is statistically at an expected level its effect of reducing the value of the rest of the debt can be taken into consideration. When that rate of failure jumps, confidence plummets in the value of the loans and they are less valuable alternatives to money. The loss in confidence in their own loans and those of other lenders who were similarly unwise, tends to restrict them from lending to all classes of borrower, including each other, to reduce risk. This has the effect of reducing the number loans made, how adventurous lenders are, how high the repayment rates are and how much collateral is required. Those changes in turn make it difficult for business to borrow for expansion and ride out problems and so employment and the greater economy suffers. Also, reduced borrowing by consumers slows spending, with the effect of reduced opportunity for businesses to profit from sales.
We may wish to consider the sustainability of economies built upon the premise of continuous growth in consumption. Large disparities in the relative sophistication of economic development must be sustained and the more sophisticated economies need to retain the perception that their economic model is best. If they fail in either part, people will stop pursuing the growth model. Debt has potential for significant further expansion providing lenders can consolidate to drive economies of scale and operate on tighter margins and apply pressure to keep interest rates low enough that borrowing is the only obvious route for many purchases.

What is being done to fix the problems

Firstly it is rather worrying and suspicious to me that the state / central banks seem to have been as blind to these problems as the money lenders claim they also were. Can they really be surprised that many years of house price growth above wage growth fuelled by low cost loans would lead to problems when interest rates rose. It seems so stupid that I would be quite credulous if a plot of grand proportions to profit under the guise of the credit crunch was revealed to me.
Anyway the government tactic to solve this problem is to get the state / central bank to lend money to the lenders. That should enable the lenders to keep trading, as their confidence of surviving problems is increased and the whole system stabilises. There are still a lot of loans that will take time to become worth what was lent, as property prices can take years to normalise, or they can be normalised quickly but catastrophically for some. Unfortunately, the government doesn’t have any money to lend, in fact it is itself a big borrower. So as neither has any immediate money the government has offered bonds (which currently are sufficiently sound to be considered as good as money) in exchange for quality debts of the lenders, proving certain guarantees are made. This is following the drawn out normalising process, rather than the rapid normalisation process. The former has the advantage of apparent stability in the short term, but the disadvantage of producing a tardy correction for the medium term and so slows the economy as a whole. The latter is better in the medium term as it affords all parties more time to recover, even the worst hit, but is worse in the short term for those in the worst positions and for general confidence if the effects are not well isolated. Both approaches will be equal in the long term as normalisation must occur.
One feels bound to ask here: who has the money. It seems that everyone is borrowing money, somebody must have some. An interesting question and to answer it one needs to remember that money is just a vector for production i.e. work done multiplied by efficiency; twice as efficient gives twice the production for the same amount of work. So the question should be: is there enough production to pay for the debt. One buys things with ones own productivity, but that includes recycling the productivity of others; specifically in creating the basic inputs to ones own work. If there were a finite amount of productivity in the world then clearly there could be no growth and so any debt should remain static. However, increasing populations and efficiencies, particularly in currently low technology economies, provide the continued growth in productivity. That is likely to continue and so debt levels can also increase, but they should not increase faster than the rate of increase in productivity.
Whether productivity is increasing or not, what level of debt can be sustained? Can it be as much or even more than the level of production? I think the answer to these questions is in confidence in the stability and predictability of the economy, markets and debt arrangements. As long as we have confidence that a debt will be repaid as arranged we can increase debt. If sufficient confidence exists then there is no reason why debt could not be arranged that could span whole lifetimes or even generations. The obvious inference from this is that we can have more debt than earnings, so long as we can sustain confidence in the stability and predictability of the economy, markets and debt arrangements. I would suggest that we are already in such a position and that explains the state / central bank conservative tactic of protecting the status quo as the least risky but otherwise least sensible option. Clearly a strategy for preventing the situation is preferable. That would imply a clutch of strong measures and checks to provide the required stability.

What are the consequences of this fix

Normally the government sells bonds to raise money. Bonds are a promise that the government will repay the money in the future; in the interim they will pay interest on the loan. The government (tax payer) must pay interest to the bond holders and in this case gets in exchange for those bonds another less reliable form of debt from the lender, rather than money and that makes the lenders more confident. Unfortunately, the country now owns the poor quality debt instead of money and is paying interest on it. In fact as we know the value of the mortgage debt the country has now acquired is over rated, not only is the country paying interest for these loans, it will have to wait years for them to be worth their face value. The net effect of all this is that the profits of the lenders in the bubble years have been protected by the government at the expense of the tax payer. Greater government debt must be paid for by taxation or cuts in services. Although this is a terrible deal for the people as a whole the government is essentially arguing that it is better than a collapse of financial institutions with potentially catastrophic ramifications. However, it may be that a better deal for the tax payer is a tactically managed collapse where the worst institutions are isolated and made to carry the whole burden.
A proper strategy to avoid us getting into this kind of situation would of course be preferable and that needs a slew of measure to check for abuses and imbalances. Unless such a system is put in place we face the probable repetition of this situation in the future.

Prognosis for the Economy

What is the prognosis for the economy?
There are three fairly obvious possibilities:
Firstly, some people think that most of the problems for the financial services have happened and so are we are near to a turnaround. This sentiment is evidenced by the current vacillating of the share markets.
Secondly, other people think that the financial services have precipitated a wider economic recession and now that will take over to drag down the economy into a deeper hole. As the economy is enabled by financial services that could certainly be true and consumer spending is changing, showing increasingly parsimonious spending patterns.
Thirdly, others believe that recent activities by central banks have staved off a potentially deepening crisis. Certainly, making more credit available to banks reduces the risks of further banking problems, which would pique the lack of confidence. However, has enough been done and are there other techniques that could be employed.

Which View is Correct?
The fact that the financial services sector was jointly at the heart of creating the problems and the fact that they are vacillating now over its depth means that they don’t have a clear vision of if we are at an economic low point, even though they are the ‘experts’. Central bankers seem to be at least as much in the dark as the financial services gurus, because they didn’t see the problems coming either. They have made increasingly strong efforts to avert a cascading of the problems into the wider economy and this indicates they too don’t know how far this will go. A preponderance of others have commented that they expect things to get worse before they get better. It would seem that the ‘clever money’ would be on a deepening of the current macro economic problems, exasperated by falling property prices along with rising food and fuel prices.
The full effects of problems on this scale do take time to ripple through an economy, so it is likely that even if we have reached the nadir of the original problems for the bankers, they may yet be revisited by their wider effects. So although none seems to have a full understanding of this problem plexus, we can expect the shockwave to ripple through the economy for some time. An important question is: will the after shock feed back to the financials strongly enough to initiate a new vanguard of problems.
My own view is that this crisis will deepen. Lending is constricted by tightening positions in financial services leading to tighter loan conditions. Many people have become comfortable with living at the edge of financial solvency and have started to find their newly restricted position forces them to cutback hard. This pruning of expenditure will denude businesses at marginal operational viability, which in turn will feed costs to the economy through unemployment. Fortunately, the businesses that are least viable and able to ride out a slowdown will tend to be small and although there will be a constant flow of them, they will have less of a confidence damaging effect than mass employers making redundancies. Also, people love to buy stuff and have a short memory for problems. As soon as their positions stabilise they will be back with what credit they can get and there will be creditors with money to lend. Further, service dominated economies are quicker to respond to demand, so for example the US and UK economies should bounce quicker than manufacturing based economies. Therefore, although I expect things to worsen, I also expect that they will flip back quickly to growth. Financial stability and solvency are less of a concern for many today and that combined with faster and more free flowing information than ever will resolve to a faster turnaround in the economy. We will soon return to the consumer dream, not because I want it, or think it is a good idea, but because most people want it. Given the desire for something and the opportunity for others to make money from that desire, there will be a race to make sure they get it, as soon as possible.

What should central bankers do?
Firstly, they must restore confidence. Confidence is the most important factor for a healthy financial services sector and central banks have moved to improve it. So much of the economic success of a country now depends upon its financial services sector that it must be unencumbered. Therefore, improving the stability of financial institutions with government backed loans is a possible scheme. However, this tardy tactic is essentially printing money and hence inflationary. Central banks know that the excessive valuations placed on residential property must be normalised. Price growth has exceeded wage growth and that leads to a bubble that draws in a disproportionate percentage of overall income to service that debt. This is not good balance and balance, after confidence, is most important. The central bankers should be encouraging the rapid normalisation of this over valuation to quickly restore parity. Drawing out normalisation will only delay the return to a balanced growing economy and I am concerned that a government statement about preventing people from losing their homes could do just that. They have not detailed how they plan to do this and it could be empty rhetoric, but if not and they start to intervene at this point they could stifle recovery for some time. An interventional strategy would have been much better to prevent the bubble. Intervention now should be to encourage a property market decline.
Secondly, they must address the root causes of the original crisis. They are manifold, but two stand out as significant: Excessive speculation using residential property, especially by people who do not understand investment markets. A poor pension system which encourages people to look for other ‘stable’ savings vehicles, in this case property investment was used.

What can we do as individuals?
As a general strategy, buck the trend. Be a saver when all about are spending big. The best time to spend big is when everyone else is not, you get the best deals then. Particularly, you should be looking at the big things: buying a house or moving to a better one, buying shares and a nice car at a bargain price. So, property will soon be a much better deal, shares already are, but will probably become better still and slightly used luxury cars will soon be everywhere at great prices. Simple really, just difficult to do.

Financial Insecurity

The current money market and housing market problems are underpinned via a common root problem, so I will treat them together. Government plans to solve the woes of the money markets and housing market are short term tactics, probably designed largely to get the government past the next general election. These plans don’t recognise the underlying problem and its causes. Also late in arriving, they instead treat some of the obvious symptoms. So, as it is unlikely that the government will do what is needed, we must recognise how best we might adapt our plans. Although the root problem for both market systems is the same, the symptoms are different.

The Symptoms

The housing market symptoms have increasingly been affordability issues for first time buyers and recently price falls leading to the infamous negative equity trap for some. Government plans to tackle affordability for first time buyers by allowing them to own a fraction of a property exasperate rather than alleviate their problem. People will commit what they can to get a house, so enabling fractional ownership simply allows the same financial commitment for a fraction of a house. Obviously, this in turn increases the price for the whole house. No one wants to spend any money on buying a house, prices are dictated by how much people are allowed to spend by lenders. Fractional ownership simply increases that allowance. There are no direct plans to help those in the negative equity trap, which reduces the mobility of the workforce and so is bad for the economy.
The financial services industry has a crisis in confidence that has stifled the free flow of money. Money is a vector for the flexibility and growth of an economy, so this impediment will have far reaching implications for the UK and is the biggest single problem we face now. Government plans to restore confidence to the money markets using bonds in exchange for property backed debt are not solving the root problem. Instead this tactic dilutes the problem by spreading it over time and distributing losses to the public purse. Another possible tactic seeks a quick correction of the problem by compressing the problem in time and localising its effects. The latter tactic, although less intuitive, has a number of advantages, prime among them is returning the economy more rapidly to a better state. As a result, even those most impacted have time to recover and more obvious measures can be enacted to restore confidence, which is certainly one of the most important qualities of a market based system. Now the problem exists one of these tactics must be employed, as the over valuation of property has to be normalised, implying losses for those that bought in late. The only question is how much to dissipate and slow those losses. It should also be noted that as the government does not in fact have money reserves to back these bonds, so their effect is ultimately inflationary. Also the drawn out tactic using bonds disengages the debtor from the consequences of their poor judgment, which has obvious negative effects.

The Root Problem

The use of residential property as an investment vehicle is at the root of both the money markets and the housing market problems. There is a complex interplay of many causes, but the two most prominent are: Firstly, pension savings are inflexible, not protected and are subject to means-testing. The lack of confidence people have in pensions has encouraged them to find alternative savings vehicles. Secondly, poor understanding of investment markets by amateurs who have access to them with residential property. Profiteering using markets is as old as humanity, but amateurs using them with residential property is a bad idea. Stability of residential property supply is too important to allow it to be used as a tool for speculation which inevitably leads to the decoupling of prices from earnings.
So how should the government tackle this twin causes. Firstly, they must introduce a government backed flexible pension scheme linked to contributions that is not means tested. Importantly, these savings must be ring-fenced and protected in law to prevent misuse. This will provide a safe haven for people with savings and reduce the tendency to use inappropriate savings vehicles as pensions. Secondly, the residential property market is too important to be used as a speculative investment tool by people with a poor grasp of its consequences. Strong controls need to be applied to the total percentage of income and its sources used to repay residential mortgage debt. Naturally, to discourage the inevitable attempts to circumvent these controls significant penalties need to applied to transgressors. It will be difficult to fabricate this control and it will need continual tinkering with to perfect, but it is essential. The ideal time to apply these controls is approaching when we reach the bottom of a property price dip. This root problem will keep recurring until it is addressed by providing a sensible pension scheme and controls designed to strongly correlate residential housing prices with earnings.

What Can We Do

Given that the government is unlikely to see the light and tackle this problem correctly as I outlined above, what can we do for ourselves.
On housing, timing is important. There will be a bottom to the housing market price falls. If you are planning to get into the property market or move, the best time to do so is at the bottom a price slump. In the end it is not the relative price of a house that matters to you, it is the amount you borrow to pay for it. That amount is always going to be lowest at the bottom of a price dip. If you want a house that costs twice as much as your current house is worth, that is easier to fund if for example your house is worth £100,000 rather than £200,000. Naturally as we get further from the bottom the less good a deal we get, but caution need only be exercised where there have been years of house price rises above wage growth. This is very difficult to do when prices are rising rapidly, but that is the time to save until the inevitable price crash. Those who are brave enough, or have no choice can get in and try to get out when they feel a good profit has been made. However, this is a very risky venture because typically the sums of money involved are large relative to income. If you do try this approach, a mercurial nature is essential. On sensing the market is topping out, sell fast and strongly discount your price to ensure a quick sale. If the price is not good enough and you are left holding the property too long you will have to discount even further later.
The financial sector has experts that understand their problems well enough. Unfortunately, those experts are not directing the businesses and so short-term and badly formed strategies still get used. It is in the interests of their directorships to ensure that directors and senior management making strategic and significant tactical decisions are well enough educated in the fundamentals of their business. General businessperson and salesperson types without the correct background simply do not have the depth of understanding required. In addition the board should sponsor multiple technical reports on the viability of any significant shift in strategy. They should also have clauses in the contracts of the most senior figures that prevent severance payments in situations where it is considered a poor strategy has lead directly to losses. This will not discourage good people from competing for these positions, in part because nobody takes one with the expectation of failure.